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INHO KIM*

Financial Responsibility Rules under
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
ABSTRACT
The potentially unlimited liabilityassociatedwith vessel ownership
under the Oil PollutionAct of 1990 has led to avoidancebehaviors
from the shipping industry, such as the restructuringof corporations to evade liability. To generate an incentivefor sound risk
management in the shippingsectorfinancialresponsibilityshould
be properlyenforced. Protectionand Indemnity Clubs, which have
traditionallyprovided financialguaranties,now refuse to provide
such safeguards to avoid liability under the Act. The magnitude of
oil movements in U.S. waters has created alternativecommercial
guarantorswithout any serious adverseimpact on U.S. oil imports.
It remainsto be seen how the U.S. marineinsurancemarket can be
restructuredwithout unnecessaryduplicationin insurancecoverage
and premiums.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States depends on oil imports for nearly 50 percent of
its oil consumption and accounts for about 30 percent of the transportation
of oil at sea worldwide. U.S. oil pollution regulations therefore directly
influence marine oil transportation worldwide.1 To control pollution risks
associated with oil transportation in U.S. waters, the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA 90)2 introduced increased liability limits and financial responsibility requirements for the shipping sector. Increasing liability has led to
avoidance behaviors from the shipping industry, including formation of
single-vessel corporations that can evade liability through corporate
defenses. The potentially unlimited liability under OPA 90 exacerbates the
effects of this trend. OPA 90 should be properly enforced to provide
financial responsibility in the shipping sector, particularly with respect to
small corporations. The success of the financial responsibility regulations
will depend upon the response of the regulated parties.
Because of the magnitude of oil movements in U.S. waters, the
financial responsibility regulations under OPA 90 have succeeded in
ensuring that the shipping industry undertakes sound risk management
* Assistant Professor of Law, College of Law, Ewha Womans UniversityU.S.D., Stanford
Law School).
1.

See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION 13 (1998).

2. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
2701-2761 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)) [hereinafter OPA 901.
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steps up to a point, without serious adverse consequences such as
disruption in the flow of U.S. oil imports or any obvious impact on oil
prices. However, it remains to be seen how the U.S. marine insurance
market will be restructured without unnecessary duplication in the
insurance coverage and premiums among insurers under the regulations.
Furthermore, the financial responsibility rule suffers its own intrinsic
limitations in terms of risk management.
IL THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PROGRAM OF OPA 90
A. Concept and Rationale of the Program
1. FinancialResponsibility Requirements and Liability Limits
As a precondition to the legal operation of its business, a responsible party for any vessel over 300 gross tons using any place under U.S.
jurisdiction, or any vessel that operates in the exclusive economic zone of
the United States to transport oil destined for the United States, must
establish and maintain evidence of financial responsibility sufficient to meet
the maximum amount of liability for removal costs and damages from oil
spills to which the responsible party would be subject in cases where the
liability limits apply. Under OPA 90, the limit of a tank vessel's liability for
each incident is set at the greater of either $1200 per gross ton or $10 million
if the vessel is greater than 3000 gross tons, and $2 million if the vessel is
3000 gross tons or less. Liability for other vessels does not exceed $600 per
gross ton or $500,000, whichever is greater.4
The liability limits do not apply if the incident is caused by the
responsible party's gross negligence or willful misconduct, or violation of
an applicable federal safety, construction, or operating regulation.5 The
responsible party would also be denied limitation of liability if it fails or
refuses to report the incident, to provide reasonable cooperation or
assistance in connection with removal activities, or to comply with orders
relating to removal activities or protection of public health.6 There are many
federal safety, construction, or operating regulations, some of which are
very specific and can be easily breached. Therefore, this would effectively
pierce the limitation of liability because a spill always would be considered
a violation of such a regulation.7

3.
4.

See 33 U.S.C. § 2716(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 33 C.F.R, § 138.10 (2001).
See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).

5. See id. § 2704(c).
6. See id.
7. See The FederalRequirementsfor Vessels to Obtain Evidence of FinancialResponsibilityfor
Oil Spill Liability under the Oil PollutionAct of 1990: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on CoastGuard
and Maritime Transportationof the House Comm. on Transportationand Infrastructure,104th Cong.
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OPA 90 does not preempt states from imposing additional liability,
unlimited in many states, with respect to oil spills in their respective states
(see Appendix I).' The liability limits under OPA 90 cannot be a shelter for
responsible parties sued under state laws providing unlimited liability.9
Removal costs and damages exceeding liability limits are to be covered by
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) 1° up to $1 billion per incident.
With the payments, the OSLTF becomes subrogated to all rights, claims,
and causes of action that the claimant has under any other law. This could
effectively increase the responsible party's liability limit up to $1 billion,
breaking the shipowner's stipulated limit of liability." Despite its stipulated
limitation of liability, OPA 90 effectively imposes unlimited liability on
responsible parties through easily pierced limitation of liability, in addition
to liability that exists under state law. A multiplicity of claims in state and
federal courts will likely arise. Ultimately, the aggregate amount of claims
could exceed the liability limit because OPA 90 neglects concursus, a
mechanism to settle all claims in one proceeding. 2 It causes many
shipowners to purchase insurance coverage exceeding the statutory
requirement under OPA 90."
2. CorporateReorganization
The strategic response of parties accountable to the rules has
important implications for the ultimate success of financial responsibility

49 (1996) (statement of Dagfinn Lunde, Managing Director, the International Association of
Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO)); PETROLEUM INDUS. RESEARCH FOUND., INC.,
TRANSPORTING U.S. OIL IMPORTS: THE IMPACTOF OI SPILL LEGISLATIoN ON THE TANKER MARKET
PREPARED FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 25 (1992).
8. See 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994).
9. See Robin Buckner Price, U.S. Oil Spill Law to Cause GrowingTanker Problem, OIL& GAS
J., Sept. 30, 1991, at 21; Jeffery D. Morgan, The Oil PollutionAct of 1990: A Look at Its Impact on
the Oil Industry, 6 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 1, 6 (1994).
10. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund was established by the Internal Revenue Code of
1986. See I.R.C. § 9509 (1994).
11. See 33 U.S.C. § 2715(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); I.R.C. § 9509 (1994); MICHAELM.
GIBSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF PETROLEUM SPILLS AND WASTES 81-82 (1993); A.F.
Bessemer Clark, The U.S. Oil PollutionAct of 1990,1991 LLOYD'S MAR. &COM. L.Q. 247,250-51;
Morgan, supra note 9, at 6; Vessel Certificate of Financial Responsibility: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
103d Cong. 260 (1994) (statement of Stathes Kulukundis, Deputy Chairman, Greek Shipping
Co-operation Committee).
12. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 50 (statement of Dagfinn Lunde, Managing Director,
the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO)); Melissa Kness
Cooney, The Stormy Seas of Oil Pollution Liability: Will Protectionand Indemnity Clubs Survive?,
16 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 343,370-71 (1993).
13. See Richard H. Hobbie, Insurance (the New WQIS Policy) at the Thirteenth New
Orleans Maritime Seminar (Jan. 26,1994).
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as a form of environmental regulation. 4 Substantially unlimited liability on
the shipping sector motivates shipping companies to minimize assets held
within the United States. The judgment-proof problem would prevail in the
industries whose liability costs are dearly high."s Shipowners have
subdivided their fleets into single-vessel companies to protect the rest of
their operations from single-vessel casualty risks by isolating such risks
through corporate defenses. 6 In 1980, single-vessel companies owned
approximately 29 percent of the ocean-going tankers trading in U.S. waters.
The percentage increased to approximately 45 percent in 1991. The potential
for unlimited liability under OPA 90 and state legislation has catalyzed this
trend.17 This reorganization is occurring on a massive scale, although there
is no guarantee that the strategy to hide true vessel ownership by split
shipowning will succeed in the U.S. judicial system.' s
Many shipping companies have reorganized their corporate
structures by transferring tankers to new shipping subsidiaries to protect
parent companies from the potential for unlimited liability risks under OPA
90.19 For example, Leif Hoegh & Company, one of Norway's largest

14. See James Boyd, "Green Money" in the Bank: Firm Responses to Environmental Financial
Responsibility Rules, 18 MANAGERIAL & DECISION EcoN. 491, 491 (1997).

15. See Lynn M. Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1,26 (1996).
16. See Gotthard Gauci, Limitation ofLiability in Maritime Law:An Anachronism?,19 MARINE
POL'Y 65, 68-69 (1995); Certificatesof FinancialResponsibility under the Oil PollutionAct: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 102d Cong. 49 (1991) (statement of Andreas K.L. Ugland, Chairman, Ugland Group
of Grimstad, Norway, on behalf of the International Association of Independent Tanker
Owners (INTERTANKO)); id. at 150 (statement of the International Association of Independent
Tanker Owners); id. at 160 (statement of Bjorn Wilhelmsen, Board Member, Senior Shipping
Advisor, I.M. Skaugen of Oslo, Norway); Robin Buckner Price, U.S. Oil Spill Law to Cause
GrowingTanker Problem, OIL&GASJ., Sept. 30,1991, at 21; Allanna Sullivan, Oil Firms, Shippers
Seek to Circumvent Laws Setting No Liability Limit for Spills, WALLST. J.,July 26,1990, at B1; U.S.
COAST GUARD, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR WATER

POLLUTION (VESSELS) 44 (1994); Antonio J.Rodriguez & Paul A.C. Jaffe, The Oil PollutionAct of
1990, 15 TUL MAR. L.J. 1, 28 (1990); Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act: Hearing and
Markup on Title III of H.R. 1465 Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International
Organizationsof the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong. 46 (1989) (statement of Brian
Hoyle, Director, Office of Ocean Law and Policy, Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State).
17. See Oil Spill Liabilityand Compensation: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Water Resources
of the House Comm. on PublicWorks and Transportation,101st Cong. 80 (1989) (statement of Brian

Hoyle, Director of Ocean Law and Policy Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State); Kusum W. Ketkar, ProtectionofMarineResources: The
U.S. Oil PollutionAct of 1990 and the Futureof the Maritime Industry, 19 MARINE POL'Y 391, 395
(1995).
18. See PETROLEUM INDUS. RESEARCH FOUND., INC.,supranote 7, at 70; Janet Porter, Tanker
Industry Divided on Restructuring,J. COM., Oct. 21, 1992, at lB.
19. See PETROLEUM INDUS. RESEARCH FOUND., INC., supra note 7, at 70.
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shipowners, transferred its tankers to a new subsidiary, Bona Shipping, at
the end of 1992. In August 1991, I.M. Skaugen, another large Norwegian
shipping group, decided to establish a separate company for its oil
lightering activities, which dominated the lightering business in the U.S.
Gulf. Exxon Corporation reorganized its shipping subsidiary, Exxon
Shipping Company, partially to avoid the impact of OPA 90.' Some parent
corporations have also sold off tank barge companies to avoid increased
liability under OPA 90. Inland tank barges frequently traverse the waters
of states and are thus subject to unlimited liability under state laws.
Influenced by the unlimited liability under state laws, New York-based
Sequa Corporation sold its tank barge company.2 Ashland Oil Company
also sold its Great Lakes tank barge operation to avoid unlimited liability
under several state laws along the Great Lakes.' This disposal of tank barge
operations might eventually contribute to an increase in undercapitalized
shipping companies.
The strategic restructuring of corporate entities will produce
undercapitalized, substandard tanker companies and remove assets from
the reach of potential claimants.' The proliferation of single-vessel
companies might result in a poor set of tankers in U.S. waters, reducing the
quality of operations such as contingency planning and manning.24
Corporate restructuring might also impede close links between shipowners
and vessel operations and undermine vessel operation safety." Firms
undercapitalized relative to the liability incurred from their market
operations do not internalize the full social costs of pollution undermining
the incentive to avoid or reduce oil pollution risk.26
3. Rationale
The implications of liability limits are twofold. While these limits
represent the maximum amount for which responsible parties can be liable,
they also represent the minimum amount of financial responsibility
required of the parties. The financial responsibility program ensures that

20. See Janet Porter, supra note 18, at 1B; Janet Plume, 1990 Law Transforms Oil Barge
Industry; Companies Sell Off Units to Avoid RiskJ. COM., Aug. 19,1991, at 1A; Joel Glass, Exxon
Plans U.S. Shipping Unit Shake-Up, LLOYD'S LIST, Mar. 3,1993, at 1; Morgan, supra note 9, at 9-10.
21. See Plume, supra note 20; Morgan, supra note 9, at 10.
22. See Plume, supra note 20; Morgan, supra note 9, at 10.
23. See Morgan, supra note 9, at 11.
24. See 102d Cong., supra note 16, at 49 (statement of Andreas K.L. Ugland, Chairman,
Ugland Group of Grimstad, Norway, on behalf of International Association of Independent
Tanker Owners (1N=Erwo)); id. at 49-50 (statement of Biom Wilhelmsen, Board Member,
Senior Shipping Advisor, I.M. Skaugen of Oslo, Norway).
25. See Porter, supra note 18, at lB.
26. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 492; U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 16, at 21; STEVEN
SHAVELL, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 279-80 (1987).
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parties are identified and are aware of their responsibility for oil pollution
costs. The program implements the principle of OPA 90 that the polluter
should pay for oil pollution costs.27 By internalizing costs, financial
responsibility requirements encourage the shipping and insurance
industries to focus on managing risks, selectively forcing out financially
unsound firms and ultimately playing a crucial role in restructuring the
shipping industry." Financial responsibility overcomes the weakness of
liability as a regulatory mechanism, judgment proof due to its ex post
nature. 29 Financial responsibility gives firms the flexibility to reduce risks
under their own conditions. It further reduces the regulator's need for
continuous monitoring, as firms obtain better information than regulators
on the risks posed by firm activities.'
B. Implementation
The owner, operator, and demise charterer are strictly, jointly, and
severally liable for oil pollution costs, but together they need only establish
and maintain an amount of financial responsibility equal to the single limit
of liability per incident. A certificate of financial responsibility (COFR) is
issued to a vessel operator that demonstrates the required financial
responsibility. The certificate is effective for no more than three years."
Financial responsibility regulations under OPA 90 provide the following:
An operator of a vessel may establish and maintain, for itself,
and, where the operator is not the owner or demise charterer,
for the owner and demise charterer of the vessel, evidence of
financial responsibility to cover [oil pollution] liability of the
owner, operator, and demise charterer arising under.. .the Oil

Pollution Act of 1990 ....32

The Coast Guard's interim rule established three compliance dates in
accordance with the types of vessels (see Table 1).'

27. See U.S. COAST GUARD, supranote 16, at 20-25.
28. See id. at 74; Nicole Roberts & Leslie White, Insurance Planning and Alternativesfor
Business, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); 103rd Cong., supra note 11, at 226
(statement of Lisa Speer, Senior Policy Analyst, Natural Resources Defense Council); 104th
Cong., supra note 7, at 81 (statement of Daniel F. Sheehan, Director of National Pollution Funds
Center).
29. See Boyd, supranote 14, at 492.
30. See id. at 494.
31. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 138.30, 138.90 (2001); U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 16, at 5.
32. 33 C.F.R. § 138.10 (2001).
33. See Financial Responsibility for Water Pollution (Vessels), 59 Fed. Reg. 34,210; 34,267
(1994); 33 C.F.R. § 138.15 (2001).
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Table L Compliance Dates of Financial Responsibility by Vessel Type
VESSEL TYPE
Tankers
Barges
Others
Source: 33 C.F.R. § 138.15 (1996).

DATES
12/28/94
07/01/95
expiration date of preexisting COR

The Coast Guard lists five methods of establishing financial
responsibility in its final regulation effective March,7, 1996: insurance,
surety bond, self-insurance, financial guaranty, or other evidence.'
Traditionally, financial responsibility has been evidenced mostly by
insurance. Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs)' have been the
primary providers of oil pollution liability insurance, as well as of financial
responsibility guaranties (See Appendix l). 6 However, although they
remain as insurance providers, they have refused to provide financial
responsibility guaranties for the purpose of OPA 90. A bonding company
authorized to do business in the United States must issue the bond, and the
penal sum of the bond may not be conditioned or dependent upon any
contract, agreement, or understanding between a vessel owner or operator
and the surety.37
To take advantage of the self-insurance method, a responsible party
must maintain working capital and net worth equal to or greater than the
amount of financial responsibility. Working capital means the amount of
current assets located in the United States, less all current liabilities
anywhere in the world. Net worth means the amount of all assets located
in the United States, less all liabilities anywhere in the world.' The Coast
Guard requires that the financial guarantor comply with all of the selfinsurance provisions and be able to demonstrate that its amounts of
working capital and net worth are no less than the aggregate applicable
amounts of financial responsibility underwritten as a guarantor and selfinsurer.' If an applicant for a COFR does not wish to use or is unable to use

34. See Financial Responsibility for Water Pollution (Vessels), 61 Fed. Reg. 9,264,9,307
(1996); 33 C.F.R. § 138.80 (2001).
35. P&I Clubs are mutual associations of shipowners,' charterers, ship operators, and
managers who have agreed to insure each other's ships on a mutual and non-profit basis.
36. See U.S. CoASTGuAR, supra note 16, at65; 103d Cong., supranote 11, at 233 (statement
of Jerry A. Aspland, President, Arco Marine, Inc., and Chairman, API General Committee on
Marine Transportation).
37. See James A. Hutchinson, Financial ResponsibilityProvisions:Are They Sinking the U.S.
Maritime Trade?, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 223,246-48 (1992).
38. See 33 C.F.R. § 138.80(b)(3) (2001).
39. See id. § 138.80(b)(4) (2001).
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one of the preceding methods, he can use a different method assuring his
ability to meet his liability.'
Surety bonds, self-insurance, and financial guaranties as methods
of establishing financial responsibility would be available mainly to large
oil companies because self-insurance requirements are stringent and surety
bonds and financial guaranties are expensive. 4 In practice, insurance and
other evidence of financial responsibility are feasible for the small and midsized independent tankers that transport approximately 71 percent of all
imported crude oil and 57 percent of all refined oil imported to the United
States.42 The small companies cannot pass on the total costs to the consumer
in a highly competitive shipping market, even if the costs are built into the
freight structure of the industry."
OPA 90 requires the insurer to be sued directly as a guarantor, if he
provides evidence of financial responsibility for a responsible party. A
direct action for oil pollution costs against the guarantor is allowed not only
for the federal government, but also for other potential claimants." When
the responsible party is unable or unwilling to pay without direct action,
primary responsibility would shift from the guarantor to the OSLTF
financed by an oil tax, thus eroding the incentives to reduce risks.4' Under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)," the insurer could
invoke all the defenses between him and the insured as well as those
between the insured and the claimant.47 Under OPA 90, a guarantor may,
however, assert only the same defenses available to the responsible party,
in addition to the defense of willful misconduct of the responsible party.'
Defenses available to the responsible parties are an act of God; an act of
war; an act or omission of a third party other than an employee, agent, or
contractor of the responsible party; or any combination of these three
conditions.49 A guarantor cannot invoke against claimants policy defenses

40. See id. § 138.80(b)(5) (2001).
41. Self-insurance was chosen by a number of states and municipalities as well as some
large oil companies. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 69-77 (statement of Daniel F. Sheehan,
Director of National Pollution Funds Center).
42.

See U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 16, at 99-100.

43. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 12, 88-90 (statement of Winthrop Wyman, Vice
Chairman, OMI Petrolink Corporation).
44. See 33 U.S.C. § 2716(f) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 33 C.F.R. § 138.80 (2001).
45. See USCG Fears over OPA 90 Changes, Joel Glass, July 20, 1995, Lloyd's List
International (on file with author); Morgan, supra note 9, at 25-26.
46. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500,86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994) [hereinafter FWPCA].
47. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(p).
48. See 33 U.S.C. § 2716(f) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 33 C.F.R. § 138.80 (2001).
49. See 33 U.S.C. § 2703 (1994).
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it may have against the insured.' Therefore, P&I Clubs are unable to invoke
the "pay to be paid" clause."'
C. Change in Providers of Financial Responsibility Guaranties
1. P&I Clubs' Refusal to Provide FinancialResponsibility Guaranties
Despite the provisions confirming liability limits for a guarantor
under both OPA 9W' and the COFR regulation," the P&I Clubs and their
principal reinsurer, Uoyd's of London,5' believe that the limits might not be

50. See 33 U.S.C. § 2716(f) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Common policy defenses are the
following: the vessel operator's failure to pay premiums on time, failure to keep the vessel in
class, insolvency, failure to repair critical equipment, and overloading. See 104th Cong., supra
note 7, at 74 (statement of Daniel F. Sheehan, Director of National Pollution Funds Center);
John M. Mitchell, Comment, The United States Cost Guard's ProposedRegulation of Certificates
of Financial Responsibility under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Fostering a Continuing Market of
Insurancefor Shipoumers?,7 ADMiN. L.J. AM. U. 121, 125-26 (1993).
51. The so-called "pay to be paid" rule is the basic principle of indemnity insurance, as
opposed to liability insurance: a member must settle the claim against him before indemnification from his P&I Club. See T.G. Coghlin, Protection&Indemnity Clubs, LLOYDS MAR. & COM.
LQ. 403,411 (1984); SIMON POLAND &TONY RooTH, GARD HANDBOOK ON P&I INSURANCE 600
(1996); STEvEN J.HAZELWOOD, P&I CLUBS: LAw AND PRACIC 283 (2d ed. 1994); 104th Cong.,
supra note 7, at 33 (statement of Richard H. Hobble, President of Water Quality Insurance
Syndicate); Morgan, supra note 9, at 12-14.
52. "Nothing in this Act...impose[s] liability with respect to an incident on any guarantor
for damages or removal costs which exceed, in the aggregate, the amount of financial
responsibility required under this Act which that guarantor has provided for a responsible
party...." 33 U.S.C. § 2716(g) (1994 & Supp. TV 1998).
53. "A guarantor that participates in any evidence of financial responsibility...[is]
liable.. .only for the amount and type of costs and damages specified in the evidence of financial responsibility....A guarantor...[is) not...considered to have consented to direct action
under any law other than.. .[OPA 90], or to unlimited liability under any law or in any venue,
solely because of the guarantor's participation in providing any evidence of financial responsibility under [the COFR regulation]....In the event of any finding that liability of a guarantor
exceeds the amount of the guaranty provided under...[the regulation), that guaranty is
considered null and void with respect to that excess." 33 C.F.R. § 138.80(d)(1)(v)(2) (2001).
54. Lloyd's is not a company, but a marketplace of approximately 27,000 individual
underwriting members. These members operate through approximately 300 syndicates. Each
syndicate decides for itself what risks it will accept. The liability of the members is several, not
joint. Each member accepts insurance risks for his personal profit or loss and each is liable to
the full extent of his private wealth to meet his own insurance obligations. Lloyd's of London
acts as a primary source of reinsurance to back the P&I Clubs and also acted as the primary
source of direct pollution coverage under pre-OPA 90 regime for approximately 1,000 vessels
(approximately 300 tank vessels) not covered under the P&I Club policies. See 102d Cong.,
supra note 16, at 31, 94 (statement of Richard L. Youell, Marine Underwriter, Lloyd's of
London, and Chairman, Janson Green Marine, Ltd.); Jason A. Garick, Crisis in the Oil Industry:
Certificatesof FinancialResponsiblity and the Oil PollutionAct of 1990,17 MARINE POL'Y 272, 286
(1993).
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upheld.' In the event of a large spill, U.S. courts would seek to find some
reason to impose liability in excess of the amount certified, or even insured
by deep-pocketed guarantors who are often foreign insurers. Under OPA
90, the P&I Clubs are forced to respond to a multiplicity of claims under
direct action and the expanded scope of recoverable damages. In addition
to removal costs, OPA 90 recognizes as'compensable the following: natural
resource damages, loss of subsistence use of natural resources, real or
personal property damages, damages for increasedcosts of public services,
loss of profits and earning capacity, and loss of revenues including taxes.The P&I Clubs also face direct action in many states due to non-preemption
of state legislation.' In addition, many state laws do not recognize
limitation of liability, as reviewed in the preceding section. The guarantor
may be exposed to multiple judgments in state and federal courts, in which
the aggregate amount of total claims could exceed the liability limit, as
reviewed in the preceding section.' The P&I Clubs provide the current $500
million coverage on the assumption that the shipowner will be able to hold
his limit of oil pollution liability in most cases (see Figure 1).' Under OPA
90, however, the shipowner might be denied limitation of liability in most
major oil spills, as reviewed in the preceding section.'

55. See 103rd Cong., supra note 11, at 47 (statements of Terence G. Coghlin, Chairman,
International Group of P&I Clubs); 104th Cong., supranote 7, at 102 (statement of International
Group of P&I Clubs); Just a Ticket for Owners to Trade?, Zurich Group, Dec. 24, 1996, Lloyd's
List International (on file with author); The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society Network
Mailing List, Financial Responsibility of Oil Companies (on file with author).
56. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (1994).
57. See 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994).
58. See Robin Buckner Price, U.S. Oil Spill Law to CauseGrowing Tanker Problem, OIL& GAS
J., Sept. 30, 1991, at 21; Cooney, supra note 12, at 370-71; 102d Cong., supra note 16, at 32
(statement of Richard J.Youell, Marine Underwriter, Lloyd's of London, and Chairman, Janson
Green Marine, Ltd.).
59. The Seawise Giant of 569,783 deadweight tons (284,891 gross tons) was the largest
tanker so far. In practice, the maximum liability limit for a tank vessel under OPA 90 would,
therefore, be approximately $341 million (1200 x 284,891). See LANE C. KENDALL &JAMES J.
BUCKLEY, THE BUSINESS OF SHIPPING 375 (6th ed. 1994).
60. See 102d Cong., supra note 16, at 40-41 (statement of Terence G. Coghlin, Chairman
Designate, The International Group of P&I Clubs); id. at 45 (statement of Billy Tauzin, a U.S.
representative from Louisiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation).
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Figure 1. Liability Limits under OPA 90 and Coverage of P&I Clubs
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The policy of the P&I Clubs is not determined by tanker owners
trading to the United States because the majority of club members are

neither trading to the United States nor tanker owners."' The P&I Clubs
believe that oil pollution in U.S. waters is not a mutual risk. Although the
risk falls on only a minority of the clubs' membership, the entire membership must pay to insure against the risk. This distorts the integrity of the
Clubs' globally operated risk-sharing structure by inequitably subsidizing
shipowners who trade to the United States at the expense of those who
trade elsewhere.62 The available reinsurance coverage worldwide for oil

61. See 103d Cong., supra note 11, at 62, 233 (statement of Jerry A. Aspland, President,
Arco Marine, Inc., and Chairman, API General Committee on Marine Transportation).
62. See SpecialistInsurers Offer Real OPA Solution for Shipowners: The Realization that OPA
90 Is Here to Stay Has PromptedCallsfrom Shipownersfor an "Industry Solution" to the Problem of
Certificateof FinancialResponsibility, Hugh Bryant, June 21, 1996, Lloyds List International (on
file with author); UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, REVIEW OF
MARITIME TRANSPORT 23 (1996); INST. OF SHIPPING ECON. & LOGISTIcS, SHIPPING STATISTICS

YEARBOOK 55 (1996); 103d Cong. supra note 11, at 223 (statement of Miles A. Kulukundis,
Chairman, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO)); id. at
32 (statement of Richard L. Youell, Marine Underwriter at Lloyd's of London); 104th Cong.,
supra note 7, at 18, 41 (statement of Chris Horrocks, Secretary General, International Chamber
of Shipping); id. at 102 (statement of International Group of P&I Clubs); id. at 142 (statement
of Donald B. Shea, President, United States Chamber of Shipping); MERCER MGMT.
CONSULTING, INC., AN ANALYSIS OF THE SYSTEM OF OIL POLLUTION CONTROL IN CALIFORNIA

MARINE WATERS V-I1 (1993).
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pollution risks is limited. The existing reinsurances of the P&I Clubs are
based on the assumption that the clubs do not provide financial guaranties
under OPA 90. In addition, direct action would undermine indemnity
characteristics of the P&I Clubs. Thus, the P&I Clubs have refused
to
64
provide evidence of financial responsibility required under OPA 90.
The P&I Clubs have provided guaranties to other governments
under the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage (CLC).' They also provided guaranties to the United States under
the pre-OPA 90 regime because the insured risk was predictable since
liability was limited in scope to federal cleanup costs and in amount to $150
per gross ton under the FWPCA, and policy defenses were available.' This
implies that the real reason for the refusal to provide evidence of financial
responsibility under OPA 90 is distrust of the U.S. courts. The other reasons,
erosion of mutuality and indemnity, were ignored under CLC and pre-OPA
U.S. laws.6'
Despite the refusal of the P&I Clubs to provide financial responsibility guaranties, the compliance dates of financial responsibility passed
neither with disruption in the flow of U.S. oil imports nor with obvious
impact on oil prices (see Appendices 111, IV).' This implies that, in practice,
the P&I Clubs can exercise no effective control over the shipping interests
that are prone to competition. The tanker industry is suffering from
worldwide surplus capacity, with resulting pressure for competition.' At

63. See 102d Cong., supra note 16, at 89-90 (statement of Terence G. Coghlin, Chairman
Designate, The International Group of P&I Clubs).
64. See Charles S. Donovan & Elizabeth M. Miller, How Is OPA 90 Faringfrom the Vessel
Interests' Perspective? A Look at the MORRIS 1. BERMAN Oil Spill and the Current Rule on
Certificatesof FinancialResponsibility, 7 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 23,53 (1994); Michael P. Donaldson, The
Oil PollutionAct of 1990: Reaction and Response, 3 ViLL ENVTL. .J., 283, 295-96 (1992).
65. CLC entered into force on June 19,1975. As of June 30, 2002, the number of contracting
states is 49 and the percentage of world tonnage is six percent. See INT'LMAR. ORG., About IMO,
at http://www.imo.org/home.asp (2002) (last visited Aug. 5,2002).
66. See 104th Cong. supra note 7, at 100 (statement of International Group of P&I Clubs);
102d Cong., supranote 16, at 86 (statement of Terence G. Coghlin, Chairman Designate, The
International Group of P&I Clubs); Donovan & Miller, supra note 64, at 53; Wu CHAO,
POLLUTION FROM THE CARRIAGE OF OIL BY SEA: LIABILIm AND COMPENSATION 270 (1996);
PETroLEum INDuS. REsEARcH FOUND., INc., supranote 7, at 44.
67. See Just a Ticket for Owners to Trade?, Zurich Group, Dec. 24, 1996, Lloyd's List
International (on file with author).
68. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 17 (statement of Chris Horrocks, Secretary General,
International Chamber of Shipping); Oil Spills: COFR Rule Did Not Trigger Cost, Supply Disruption,Coast GuardOfficial Says, June 27,1996, Daily Environment Report (on file with author).
69. See U.S. COAST GUARD, supranote 16, at 68; Shetland IslandOil Spill: Oversight Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversightand Investigationof the House Comm. on NaturalResources, 103d
Cong. 38 (1993) (statement of Nina Sankovitch, senior attorney, Natural Resources Defense

Council).
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the end of 1990, surplus capacity was calculated at 56.4 million deadweight
tons." Despite the potential of unlimited liability on tanker owners with
respect to oil transportation in U.S. waters, the majority of tanker owners
have no other choice for commercial survival but to continue to trade to the
U.S. market, which is the largest in the world.'
2. The Development of New FinancialResponsibility Guarantors
The magnitude of the U.S. oil market has created alternative
commercial guarantor schemes in the market place vacated by the refusal
of P&I Clubs to provide financial guaranties. The Water Quality Insurance
Syndicate (WQIS) has continued to provide financial guaranties, and new
major commercial instruments include Shoreline Mutual, First Line,
Shipowners' Insurance and Guaranty Company Ltd. (SIGCo), ARVAK, and
Syndicate 724.' In particular, independent of the P&I Clubs' position, the
Lloyd's market has changed its position to provide financial guaranties
through Syndicate 724 despite continuation of its earlier reasons for not
having done so, such as direct action, reduced policy defenses, and the
potential of unlimited liability under OPA 90.73 The invisible hand of the
U.S. oil market has produced a sub-insurance market for financial
responsibility purposes only, without direct connection with the P&I Clubs.
As the P&I Clubs failed to produce an "industry solution," the non-captive
portion of the world's marine liability insurance industry developed a
"market-based solution" for the risk of potentially unlimited liability.74
However, membership in a P&I Club is required in most cases as a
condition of subscribing to the new guarantors' coverage in real markets.'h

70. See Derek Bamber, Never up for Long, 58 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Aug. 1991, at 15.
71. See Oil Spill Prevention Measures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guardand
MaritimeTransportationof the House Comm. on Transportationand Infrastructure,105th Cong. 184
(1997) (International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, INTERTANKO, U.S. Port &
Terminal Safety Study, a discussion paper).
President,
72. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 31 (statement of Richard H. Hobbie, III,
Water Quality Insurance Syndicate); Hobbie, supra note 13.
73. See Syndicate to Write Risk on US Oil Spill Rules, Joel Glass, Mar. 9, 1996, Lloyd's List
International (on file with author).
74. A captive insurance company means a company formed to insure the risks of their
parent corporations. "Non-captive" means "non-P&I Club." See PRICE WATERHOUSE, A GUIDE
TO THE UK INSURANCE INDUsRy 36-7 (1990); 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 55 (statement of
Daniel F. Sheehan, Director of National Pollution Funds Center); Paul S. Edelman, International
Conventionfor Oil Spills, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1996, at 3; OPA 90 Spill Risk Bodies Lose Out, Joel
Glass, June 3,1995, Lloyd's List International (on file with author).
75. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 93 (statement of Charles J. DiBona, President,
American Petroleum Institute); FinancialRules on PollutionStill Spark Strong Feelings,Joel Glass,
June 28, 1996, Lloyd's List International (on file with author); Oil Spills: COFR Rule Did Not
Trigger Cost, Supply Disruption, Coast Guard Official Says, June 27, 1996, Daily Environment
Report (on file with author).
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D. The Premiums for the Financial Responsibility Guarantors
The Coast Guard's Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) estimated that
premiums to commercial financial responsibility guarantors would be $2.03
per gross registered ton (grt) per voyage and that it would be translated into
$0.145/barrel of crude oil ($0.00345/gallon of refined product). It also
projected the annual total premiums of the commercial insurers for 1994 at
$415 million.76 The actual annual cost of obtaining commercial financial
responsibility guaranties for seagoing vessels was approximately $60-70
million, below the estimate of the RIA.7' This cost translates into $0.02 per
barrel of crude oil (0.145 X 70/415). Because the international reinsurers
assume most of the premiums and thus set the cost of financial responsibility coverage accordingly, the P&I Clubs' participation in the COFR program
would not have reduced the shipowner's costs in obtaining the financial
guaranties.7 Under a hypothetical scheme that the P&I Clubs contemplated
devising to meet financial responsibility requirements in 1994, the annual
surcharge of the P&I Clubs was about $80 million. 9
The P&I Clubs continue to provide coverage for oil pollution
liability under OPA 90, with an additional premium in accord with the

76. The RIA had estimated that the premiums assessed by Shoreline and First Line were,
at worst, seven times the P&I Clubs' surcharge under OPA 90 that was 29 cents per grt per
voyage. See U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 16, at 80-82; Financial Responsibility for Water
Pollution (Vessels), 59 Fed. Reg. 34,210; 34,226 (1994); Donovan & Miller, supra note 64, at 55;
Benjamin H. Grumbles & Joan M. Manley, The Oil PollutionAct of 1990: Legislation in the Wake
of a Crisis, NAT. REsouRcEs & ENv'T, Fall 1995, at 35, 40; 103d Cong., supra note 11, at 82
(statement of Robert E. Kramek, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard); id. at 141 (statement of
Hugh Bryant, Chairman, Mutual Management Ltd.); 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 14, 29
(statement of John J. Gallagher, Chairman of the Board, Gallagher Marine Systems, Inc.).
77. The Coast Guard estimated the combined premiums for First Line and Shoreline to
be $70 million for 1995 and expected them to be less in 1996. First Line was more expensive.
See U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 16, at 82; 103rd Cong., supra note 11, at 82 (statement of
Robert E:Kramek, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard); 104th Cong., supranote 7, at 46 (statement
of Dagfinn Lunde, Managing Director, the International Association of Independent Tanker
Owners (INTERTANKO)); id. at 20 (statement of Svein Ringbakken, Chief Counsel, the
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO)); id. at 54 (statement
of Daniel F. Sheehan, Director of National Pollution Funds Center); id. at 18 (statement of Chris
Horrocks, Secretary General, International Chamber of Shipping); id. at 142 (statement of
Donald B. Shea, President, U.S. Chamber of Shipping).
78. Shoreline Mutual, Shoreline Surpasses the 2,000 Milestone, at http://www.mutrisk.
com/shoreline/circulars/c031297.html (Mar. 12,1997); CongressSetback for OPA 90 Hopes, Joel
Glass, June 28,1996, Lloyd's List International (on file with author); 104th Cong., supra note 7,
at 58 (statement of Daniel F. Sheehan, Director of National Pollution Funds Center, U.S. Coast
Guard).
79. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 21 (statement of Chris Horrocks, Secretary General,
International Chamber of Shipping).
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increase in the P&I Clubs' reinsurance costs for risks in U.S. waters under
OPA 90. In 1991, the Clubs imposed a surcharge for the first time on
tankers trading to the United States.!8' An additional $200 million oil
pollution coverage is obtainable for tankers through their P&I Clubs from
the commercial market, underwriters at Lloyd's of London. The combined
cost of the surcharge of the P&I Clubs82 and the optional additional
coverageP was estimated at 57.33 cents (29 cents + 28.33 cents) per grt per
voyage in 1994. It would be translated into less than $0.04/barrel of crude
oil. The total cost of the surcharge and the optional coverage to the United
States was estimated at less than $117 million in 1 9 94 se The cost of the
commercial guaranties was close to that of the surcharge.'
The sum of the costs of the commercial guaranties and those of the
P&I Clubs' surcharge and the optional coverage is $0.06 per barrel of crude
oil ($0.02 + $0.04). This is very close to the oil tax, $0.05 per barrel of oil
under the OSLTF.87 The P&I Clubs' reinsurance premium rose by nearly
seven percent from approximately $360 million to approximately $387
million in the period 1993 to 1994.1 There was a substantial increase in
insurance costs to shipowners during the early 1990s. However, cost
reductions for shipowners with good records were observed in the latter
half of 1994. The costs have been reduced from 1995 to 1998." The increase
in the size of tankers and tanker surplus have led to lower transportation
costs, approximately $1.00 per barrel, or between five and ten percent of the

80.

See U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 16, at 28-30,33; POLAND & Room, supra note 51, at

33,365,482,625,628.
81. See Robin Buckner Price, U.S. Oil Spill Law to CauseGrowing Tanker Problem, OIL& GAS
J., Sept. 30, 1991, at 21, 26; P&I Clubs and the Oil Pollution Act, Ann Moore, Aug. 23, 1994,
Lloyd's List International (on file with author); Aviva Freudmann, Oil Tanker Owners Adjust
to Risks under Pollution Law, J.CoM., Feb. 21, 1991, at 9A.
82. The oil pollution surcharge of the P&I Clubs was 29 cents per grt per voyage in 1994,
32 cents in 1991, 41 cents in 1992, and 23 cents in 1993. See U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 16, at
75.
83. The premium for the additional coverage for an oil tanker was estimated at 28.33 cents
per grt per voyage in 1994, 17.50 cents in 1991, 20 cents in 1992, and 24 cents in 1993. See id. at
77.
84. See id. at 78.
85. See id. at 80.
86. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 21 (1996) (statement of Winthrop Wyman, Vice
Chairman, OMI Petrolink Corporation).
87. See I.R.C. § 4611 (c)(2)(B) (1994).
88. See Janet Porter, Shipowners Face7% Rate Increasefor Reinsurance,J. CoM., Feb. 1, 1994,
at 7A.
89. See Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd., MarineInsurance:Issues, Practicesand Costs (on
file with author).
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landed price.9° The cost of P&I insurance accounts for five to seven percent
of a tanker's non-fuel operating costs (see Table II, Appendix V).9' This
implies that the increase in transportation costs caused by OPA 90 would
have insignificant impact on the imported oil price to the United States.92
Table U. Oil Transportation Cost, Insurance Cost and Oil Tax Per Barrel
Oil Transportation Cost
$1.00
Commercial Guarantors' Premiums
$0.02
P&I Clubs' Surcharge
$0.02
Optional $200 million Coverage's Premiums
$0.02
Oil Tax
$0.05
Source: United States Coast Guard, Regulatory Impact Analysis Financial Responsibility for Water
Pollution (Vessels) (1994); and National Research Council, Double-Hull Tanker Legislation (1998).

Oil prices in the United States started to increase considerably in
August 1990 when OPA 90 was signed into law. Oil prices peaked in
October 1990 and stabilized from February 1991. Even in December 1994,
when the financial responsibility regulation for oil tankers was implemented, there was no symptom of unstable oil prices in the United States.93
The cost-push effect from the regulation has been diluted by low prices of
imported oil in the world oil market. Crude oil import costs worldwide
declined from 1990 until 1994. 94 Changes in the oil prices in the United
States have paralleled those in the rest of the world except at the time just
after the enactment of OPA 90, which led to the visible increase in oil prices
coupled with the threat of the Persian Gulf crisis (see Appendix IV).
Prolonged U.S. energy policy based on low priced, imported crude
oil generates economic and environmental implications. There is a concern
that the United States is dependent on imported oil for nearly 50 percent of
its oil consumption and needs to develop policies to reduce oil imports by

90. Marine oil transportation costs represented almost half the price of oil delivered to a
destination in the early 1950s. See DREWRY SHIPPING CONSULTANTS, THE INTERNATIONAL OIL
TANKER MARKET: SUPPLY, DEMAND AND PROFITABILITY To 2000 65 (1994); NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 14-15.
91. See 101st Cong., supra note 16, at 33 (Temple, Barker & Sloane, Inc., Analysis of
Alternative Approaches to Tanker Oil Spill Liability and Compensation).
92. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note l, at 15.
93. See OIL & GAS JOURNAL PUBLICATIONS ENERGY DATABASE, ENERGY STATISTICS
SOURCEBOOK 411 (Sandra Meyer et al., eds., 12th ed. 1997).
94. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY PRICES AND TAXES: THIRD QUARTER 1997, at 36-37
(1997); INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, OIL INFORMATION 1996, at 11.33 (1997).
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encouraging domestic oil production.95 The policies to boost domestic oil
production, accompanied by a concurrent decrease in imports would result
in economic growth through increased domestic investment. However, the
policy based on low priced imported oil could not be easily abandoned
because of the impact on the economy and its political implications."
Taking into account the need to foster favorable conditions for domestic oil
production and sufficiently low world oil prices, the United States would
risk an increase in oil prices resulting from the implementation of the
financial responsibility regulations as long as it did not result in a negative
impact on the U.S. economy.
E. The Need for Coordination of Coverage by the P&I Clubs and the New
Financial Responsibility Guarantors
The new guarantors require the membership of the vessel in a P&I
Club and expect P&I Clubs to cover oil pollution costs with little real risk
of liabilities on themselves. Despite their refusal to provide financial
guaranties, the P&I Clubs have continued to provide oil pollution coverage
in the United States and have so far assumed oil pollution costs in most
cases without sharing the financial burden with the new guarantors. The
new guarantors assume the costs only in the event a P&I Club chooses not
to provide coverage.' However, there have been a few cases in which the
P&I Clubs invoked their policy defenses or refused oil pollution coverage
in U.S. waters, so the financial responsibility guarantors were exposed to
liability.98 It is not certain whether the P&I Clubs in their political environ-

95. See DOE Unveils Oil and GasPlan; IndustryFinds Little to Praise,OIL&GAsJ., Nov.-Dec.
1993, at 21,22; IPAA, A Sign that America Is Losing Controlover Its Energy Future,Fact Sheet, U.S.
Energy Information Administration, United States of America (on file with author).
96. See DOE Unveils Oil and Gas Plan; Industry Finds Little to Praise,supra note 95, at 21.
97. See Owners Spend up to $100 M to Stay in Line with US Oil Pollution Law, Jim Mulrenan,
Jan. 20,1995, Lloyd's List International (on file with author); 104th Cong., supranote 7, at 89-90
(statement of Winthrop Wyman, Vice Chairman, OMI Petrolink Corporation).
98. The Syabus Singpurawas found stranded 14 miles off Honolulu in Oct.1996. The Coast
Guard held First Line responsible for indemnifying the costs. First Line was ordered to pay the
cost of removing a tanker with a potential threat of pollution from U.S. waters. First Line had
to pay approximately $300,000 for removing the ship outside the United States following the
bankruptcy of the owners. See Just a Ticket for Owners to Trade?, Zurich Group, Dec. 24, 1996,
Uoyd's List International (on file with author); FirstLine Raises COFR Cost Worries, Liz Shuker,
Dec. 9, 1996, Lloyd's List International (on file with author). In the Jahre Spray incident, the
Gard P&I Club sought to avoid the oil spill liabilities. See Just a Ticket for Owners to Trade,
Zurich Group, Dec. 24,1996, Lloyd's List International (on file with author); Gard and the Jahre
Spray, Liz Shuker, Jan. 8, 1997, Lloyd's List International (on file with author). The Cibro
Savannah exploded at the pier in Linden, New Jersey, on Mar. 6,1990, spilling approximately
2380 barrels of heating oil. In the incident, a policy defense was employed against the insured.
See 102d Cong., supra note 16, at 64 (statement of Rear Admiral Richard A. Appelbaum,
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ment would seek to avoid liability for an oil spill in case of a member's
bankruptcy because it would require balancing their two contradicting
tasks, to present a responsible profile to U.S. regulators and to preserve
their mutuality by notproviding undue subsidy to a bankrupt member."
The new guarantors also bear the financial burden for claims in excess of
the P&I Clubs' $500 million coverage, generating a net increase in coverage
available, to shipowners."m The financial responsibility guarantors are
assuming rare but substantial risks to foot the bill for oil pollution costs 01
and have paid approximately $66 million annually in removal costs and
damages."2 To provide extended oil pollution coverage rather than
duplicate coverage, it is necessary to coordinate the coverage provided by
both the P&I Clubs and the new guarantors."°3 The coordination needs to be
conducted in a manner that considers whether the whole insurance
coverage can meet the real oil pollution risk rather than the liability limits
under OPA 90. This may be decided by considering benefits to the
shipowners, service consumers, and U.S. society."
F. Impact on the Structures of the Shipping Industry and the P&I Clubs
The effectiveness of financial responsibility as a form of environmental regulation is decided by the strategic response of responsible
parties. Insurers in a compulsory liability insurance system would select
persons to participate in liability-generating economic activity by insuring
only those who demonstrate financial responsibility. 5 An appropriate level
of financial responsibility is essential, preventing persons from judgment-

Commander, National Pollution Funds Center, U.S. Coast Guard); U.S. Minerals Management
Service (on file with author); Roberts & White, supra note 28.
99. See MERcER MGMT. CONSULnNG, INC., supra note 62, at V-18.
100. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 24-25 (testimony of Chris Horrocks, Secretary
General, International Chamber of Shipping); 103d Cong., supra note 11, at 258 (statement of
Jeffrey N. Shane, Counsel to Shoreline Mutual Insurance).
101. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 46 (statement of Dagfinn Lunde, Managing Director,
the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO)); id. at 89-90
(statement of Winthrop Wyman, Vice Chairman, OMI Petrolink Corporation).
102. See Steve Carpenter, Mitigatingthe FinancialRisks of an Oil Spill: Certificatesof Financial
Responsibility, 53 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARINE SAFETY COUNS., Apr.-June 1996, at 50, 53.
103. See Specialist Insurers Offer Real OPA Solution for Shipowners: The Realization that OPA
90 Is Here to Stay Has Prompted Calls from Shipownersfor an "Industry Solution" to the Problem of
Certificate of Financial Responsibility, Hugh Bryant, June 21, 1996, available at WESTLAW,
Lloyds List International (on file with author); James P. Walsh, Environmental CoverageIssues
underMarine Insurance Policies, 7 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 1,7 (1994).
104. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 143 (letter from Duncan C. Smith III, Counselor at
Law, Dyer, Ellis, andJoseph, to Howard Coble on behalf of the Greek Shipping Co-Operation
Committee).
105. See Lopucki, supra note 15, at 84-89.

Sumnmer 20021

FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY RULES

proofing and not excluding persons demonstrating moderate financial
responsibility. The financial responsibility rule has the effect of a two-edged
sword on the shipping industry. While relatively small shipping companies
that cannot self-insure have to assume premiums for the financial responsibility guarantors, relatively large shipping companies that can self-insure
do not have to bear the additional premiums. Financial responsibility is
costlier for small firms to demonstrate and may cause small firms to cease
operation."° However, this is an intended consequence of financial
responsibility because it selectively forces from the market place financially
unsound firms unable to satisfy the requirements." 7
Financial responsibility may face significant political opposition if
many small firms are adversely affected. On the other hand, the enforcement of financial responsibility particularly in small firms would maximize
its social utility.1°s Rather than judgment-proofing themselves,"° large firms
would assume full responsibility for pollution costs to facilitate public
relations and smooth future trading operations .with regulatory
authorities.110 Little political opposition to financial responsibility has been
observed from the industry regulated under OPA 90 as compared with
other schemes such as the underground petroleum storage tanks program,
partly because relatively deep-pocketed oil and shipping firms can selfinsure.' As risk management is a critical factor in the oil business world,
insurance plays a crucial role in restructuring the shipping industry."'

106. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 73 (statement of Daniel F. Sheehan, Director of
National Pollution Funds Center); id. at 12, 88-90 ( testimony of Winthrop Wyman, Vice
Chairman, OMI Petrolink Corporation).
107. See U.S. COAST GuARD, supra note 16, at 74.
108. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 503.
109. Liability for the Exxon Valdez oil spill amounted to about $9 billion. The Exxon Valdez
was owned and operated by Exxon Shipping Company, a $100 million subsidiary of Exxon
USA, a subsidiary of Exxon Corporation. Even though liability for the spill could have been
confined to Exxon Shipping Company, Exxon Corporation assumed responsibility for it. Exxon
Corporation settled the natural resource damage lawsuit with the Environmental Protection
Agency and the state of Alaska for $1 billion ($900 million in civil damages and $100 million
in criminal fines). See Lopucki, supranote 15, at 52; Ketkar, supra note 17, at 394; GIBSON, supra
note 11, at 63.
110. See N.J. Colton, The Underwritingof OilPollution Risks, in LIABILIT FOR DAMAGE TO THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT 149,152 (Colin M. de la Rue ed., 1993).
111. Underground petroleum storage tanks are a common method used by fuel
distributors, municipalities, and firms for petroleum storage. The United States has about 1.4
million tanks. The tanks are regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994). See Boyd, supra note 14, at 503; 103d Cong., supra note 11, at 15
(statement of Daniel F. Sheehan, Director, National Pollution Funds Center, U.S. Coast Guard);
102d Cong., supra note 16, at 47 (statement of Mark R. Buese, Vice President Administration,
Dixie Carriers, Inc., Member, American Waterways Operators).
112. See Roberts & White, supra note 28.
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The P&I Clubs are facing unfavorable legal, political, and economic
conditions. Competition among new guarantors has led to premium
reduction and to distribution of company shares to participants. This trend
could weaken the P&I Clubs' assertion regarding dissipation of financial
resources of the shipping industry.11 It is understandable that the United
States would favor new entities that generate positive economic implications over the P&I Clubs, which are traditionally based exclusively in the
United Kingdom or in Scandinavian countries. This situation, triggered by
P&I Clubs' failure to address financial responsibility requirements of OPA
90 and coupled with the European Commission's demand for fair competition on premium fixing and transfers between P&I Clubs, could eventually
increase the flexibility of the P&I market.1 4 Independent of the P&I Clubs'
position, the Lloyd's market has changed its position to provide financial
guaranties, as reviewed in the preceding section. Some new commercial
guarantor schemes are supported by some P&I Clubs, though the risk from
operation of the new schemes is separated from the P&I Clubs.'
The P&I Clubs are under substantial pressure from shipowners
either to formulate an "industry solution" to the problem of compliance
with the financial responsibility regulation or to at least help them to use
new guarantors. Shipowners are reluctant to assume the additional cost of

113. See Bermudian Reinsurer May Cut Cost of COFRs, Liz Shuker, Nov. 5,1996, Lloyds List
International (on file with author).
114. The P&I Clubs pool claims. The International Group Agreement (IGA), a noncompetition agreement among the P&I Clubs, seeks to discourage unreasonable competition
of rate reduction because the reduction can be derived by reducing essential reserves. The IGA
coordinates premium rates and transfers between clubs in members' first year of entry with
a club. The European Commission's opinion is that the IGA might be inconsistent with the
commission's regulations relating to free competition because it prevents or restricts
competition on premium fixing and transfers between clubs. See HAZELWOOD, supra note 53,
at 359-70; POLAND & RooTH, supra note 51, at 33; Jonathan Faull, Article 85(3)-ExemptionInsurance-Protectionand Indemnity Clubs, 12 EUR. L. REV. 275,276 (1987). The IGA was exempted
from the European Union's competition policy until 1995. With the P&I Clubs' renewal request
for the exemption, the Competition Directorate of the European Commission challenged the
necessity of the IGA. The clubs insist that continuation of the IGA for pooling claims is
indispensable. With respect to pressure from the European Commission, many shipowners
switched clubs, which may imply a gradual change toward flexible P&I Clubs. See Marine Log,
P&I Clubs Yield to EuropeanPressureand Splash Individual Owners' Exposure to OverspillCalls (on
file with author); Club Managers Try to Hold the Premium Line, Jim Mulrenan, Feb. 22, 1995,
Lloyd's List International (on file with author); Nicos Coronis, CartelsDo Not Bring the Benefits
Claimed, Sept. 29, 1997, Lloyd's List International (on file with author).
115. The creation of SIGCo was supported by UK P&I, Steamship Mutual, and Gard P&I
Clubs. See Just a Ticket for Owners to Trade, Zurich Group, Dec. 24, 1996, Lloyd's List
International (on file with author).
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the COFR in addition to their traditional insurance expenses. 6 Furthermore, financial resources for the guaranties are flowing out of the
industry." 7 Shipowners who bear the cost of the financial guaranties have
sought to offset the cost by achieving a reduction in their P&I costs."'
Sufficient pressure from shipowner members who wish to trade to the
United States would motivate selective reversals of the P&I Clubs' position
to offer some form of guaranty in the future. The P&I Clubs are expected to
be restructured through merger and consolidation or informal cooperation,
with greater market share occupied by the fixed premium market, thus
expanding choice for shipowners." 9 On the other hand, the business of the
new guarantors is not likely to be so lucrative because they have paid about
$66 million annually in oil pollution costs against about $70 million for
annual premiums. This also enhances the possibility for cooperation
between the P&I Clubs and the new guarantors.
G. The Sustainability of the New Financial Responsibility Guarantors
The new financial responsibility guarantors are a fast-growing
segment of the insurance market, eroding the market share of alternative
methods of obtaining COFRs, such as self-insurance and surety bonds. 2
Many shipowners have changed from self-insurance to new guarantors
because the latter enables the shipowners to avoid risking their own assets
(see Appendices VI, VII)."' However, the share of financial guaranty
remained approximately the same because financial guaranty enables the
shipowners to limit their risk exposure. Under the financial guaranty
method establishing a subsidiary special purpose company as a separate
legal entity to serve as guarantor, direct action could be taken against the

116. See Russ Banham, The P&I Club Saga, Sept. 1, 1995, availableat 1995 WL 12528260; Jim
Mulrenan, Owners Spend up to $100 M to Stay in Line with U.S. Oil PollutionLaw, Jan. 20,1995,
Lloyd's List International (on file with author).
117. See Liz Shuker, Dry CargoOperatorsSeek OPA Rules Action, June 21,1996, Lloyd's List

International (on file with author).
118. See Jim Mulrenan, Club Managers Try to Hold the Premium Line, Feb. 22,1995, Lloyd's
List International (on fie with author).
119. See Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd., MarineInsurance:Issues, Practicesand Costs (on
fie with author).
120. See SHORELINE MUTUAL LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2-13 (1995); Liz Shuker, Shoreline
PredictsPriceFall,Oct. 11, 1996, Lloyd's List International; Shoreline Mutual, supranote 78; Joel
Glass, CongressSetback for OPA 90 Hopes, June 28,1996, Lloyd's List International (on file with
author); Joel Glass, OPA 90 Spill Risk Bodies Lose Out, June 3,1995, Lloyd's List International
(on file with author); 104th Cong., supranote 7, at 55 (statement of Daniel F. Sheehan, Director
of National Pollution Funds Center).
121. See Jim Mulrenan, LOOP Discounts Offered on OilspillCertificates,Feb. 8,1995, Lloyd's
List International (on file with author); U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 16, at 98.
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subsidiary, not against the parent company. 2 Inflexibility of the P&I Clubs
has led to structural changes of the insurance industry in the U.S. oil
transportation market. The new guarantors expand choices of the insurance
coverage and the premiums for the shipowners."2 Similar rules to the U.S.
COFR scheme1 2 4are expected to expand beyond the United States in the
coming years.
The shipping industry remains skeptical about the long-term
sustainability of the new instruments and questions whether their coverage
and the reinsurance coverage would be sufficient to cover claims from a
major spill in U.S. waters as compared with the P&I Clubs' coverage.1" It
is premature to project their performance because they have not so far been
tested in a major oil spill. 26 It remains to be seen whether the new
instruments will provide continuous and stable services for the shipowners
and U.S. society, whether the P&I Clubs will change their position to
comply with the financial responsibility rules and be restructured among
themselves, and whether the operations of the P&I Clubs and the new
instruments will be coordinated without unnecessary duplication in
insurance coverage and premiums.2 7
H. Limitations of the Financial Responsibility Rule in Generating
Incentives and Internalizing Oil Pollution Costs
If the financial responsibility rule is properly enforced, it will
alleviate concerns about incentives and internalization of oil pollution costs
in the shipping sector up to the extent to which financial responsibility is
required by the rule. Many firms cannot self-insure and must therefore

122. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 77 (statement of Daniel F. Sheehan, Director of
National Pollution Funds Center).
123. See Hugh Bryant, Specialist Insurers Offer Real OPA Solution for Shipowners:The
Realization that OPA 90 Is Here to Stay Has Prompted Calls from Shipowners for an "Industry
Solution" to the Problem of Certificate of Financial Responsibility, June 21, 1996, Lloyds List
International (on file with author).
124. See John J. Dwyer, Scandinavian Re and Terra Nova Announce New COFR Facility, June
12,1997, PR Newswire (on file with author).
125. See 103d Cong., supra note 11, at 234 (statement of Jerry A. Aspland, President, Arco
Marine, Inc., and Chairman, API General Committee on Marine Transportation); 104th Cong.,
supra note 7, at 18,42 (statement of Chris Horrocks, Secretary General, International Chamber

of Shipping).
126. See 104th Cong., supranote 7, at 68 (responses to post hearing questions of Daniel F.
Sheehan, Director, National Pollution Funds Center, U.S. Coast Guard); EDGAR GOLD, GARD
HANDBOOK ON MARINE POLLuTIoN 176 (2d ed. 1998).
127. See CHAO, supra note 66, at 270-71; Hugh Bryant, Specialist Insurers Offer Real OPA
Solution for Shipowners: The Realization that OPA 90 Is Here to Stay Has Prompted Calls from
Shipownersfor an 'Industry Solution' to the Problem of Certificate of Financial Responsibility, June
21, 1996, Lloyds List International (on file with author).
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acquire insurance to satisfy financial responsibility requirements. Compulsory liability insurance can solve the problem of the responsible party's
insufficient financial resources to cover oil pollution costs and mitigate
excessive engagement in risky activities.12 When financial responsibility is
demonstrated through insurance, insurers have an incentive to monitor the
behaviors of insured firms to prevent moral hazard. 9 Substandard vessels
are discouraged from trading in U.S. waters as a result of increased
vigilance by the insurance sector resulting from the financial responsibility
program.3 Insurance works as a form of environmental regulation by
generating financial incentives to reduce environmental risks. Increasing the
incentive for better risk management depends on both the selective
premiums and the corresponding strategic response of tanker owners. 3
However, the insurers fail to provide a proper control over the
shipping sector. Discriminating between the individual risks requires
collection, assessment, and upgrading of information regarding the risks.
This is hindered by market imperfections in the insurance industry, due to
information costs caused by the information asymmetry between the
shipping sector and insurers.'3 2 Insurers cannot closely monitor the
behaviors of the shipping sector and make the connection between the
firms' risk management and premiums or other policy terms." Insurance
premiums might not reflect the shipping sector's risk factors.M Because the
insurance industry is competitive and fragmented, insurers also fail to
conduct proper inspections before underwriting. The insurers thus fail to
reasonably consider shipowners' safety records."M The P&I Clubs also have
limitations resulting from their mutuality and non-profit character. The
premiums, or calls, are calculated on an ex post basis for the entire fleet of
an individual shipowner, not on an ex ante basis for an individual vessel.
As a result, the P&I Clubs do not collect information about safety features

128. See Steven Shavell, The Judgment ProofProblem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45,46 (1986);
Volkmar J. Hartte, Oil Pollution Caused by Tanker Accidents: Liability Versus Regulation, 24 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 41, 47 (1984).

129. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 494; U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 16, at 87.
130. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 81 (statement of Daniel F. Sheehan, Director of
National Pollution Funds Center).

131.

See Hartje, supra note 128, at 50.

132. See 102d Cong., supra note 16, at 42-43,48 (statement of Terence G. Coghlin, Chairman
Designate, The International Group of P&I Clubs).
133. See Di Jin & Hauke L. Kite-Powell, Environmental Liability, Marine Insuranceand An
Optimal Risk SharingStrategyfor Marine Oil Transport, 10 MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 1, 5 (1995);
Shavell, supra note 128, at 54; Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120,
127,131 (1982).

134. See STEvEN L. CROOKSHANK, MODiFNG SiNGLE-HULL TANKERs: COSTS AND BENEFITS
3(1998).
135.

See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS 186-87 (1984).
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of individual vessels."3 The insurers thus fail to efficiently control the
shipping sector. In turn, this undermines incentives to take safety steps in
the shipping sector.
Financial responsibility is also poorly enforced. As reviewed in the
preceding section, new financial responsibility guarantors have superseded
P&I Clubs in providing financial responsibility guaranties under CPA 90.
In compulsory liability insurance systems such as financial responsibility
guarantor schemes, insurers compete to reduce premiums by externalizing
137
the risk they contract to assume and tend to offer minimum coverage.
Because financial responsibility is costly for shipping companies to
demonstrate, they use a method of compliance that externalizes as much
risk as possible." In practice, even though coverage is higher than
stipulated liability limits under CPA 90, new guarantors generally offer
lower coverage ranging from $395 to $400 million than P&I Clubs' coverage,
$500 million (see Figure I). 39 While it may be premature to project the
performance of new guarantors, as reviewed in the preceding section, lower
coverage obviously aggravates a concern about the adequacy of coverage
for claims from major oil spills."4 In voluntary insurance systems such as
P&I Clubs, policy defenses to coverage cause the insured to control the
quality of maintenance and management of insured ships and cooperate in
determining insurability and risk rating.141 By contrast, the cooperation of
the insured is not expected in compulsory insurance. This market failure to
provide cost-effective insurance coverage leads to an increased burden of
insurance regulation.14 The growth of new financial responsibility
guarantors in the insurance market exposes potential for this market failure,
externalizing oil pollution costs and thus undermining incentives.
Additionally, there is concern about insurance market capacity.
There were two recent crises in the insurance market that constricted
insurance market capacity: the 1984 liability insurance crisis and the 1992

136. See Hartte, supra note 128, at 51.
137. See Lopucki, supra note 15, at 80.
138. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 502.
139. See 104th Cong., supra note 7, at 68 (responses to post hearing questions of Daniel F.
Sheehan, Director, National Pollution Funds Center, U.S. Coast Guard); GOLD, supranote 126,
at 176.
140. See 103d Cong., supra note 11, at 234 (statement of Jerry A. Aspland, President, Arco
Marine, Inc., and Chairman, API General Committee on Marine Transportation); 104th Cong.,
supra note 7, at 18, 42 (statement of Chris Horrocks, Secretary General, International Chamber

of Shipping).
141. See 102d Cong., supra note 16, at 43 (statement of Terence G. Coghlin, Chairman
Designate, The International Group of P&I Clubs).
142. See Lopucki, supra note 15, at 80-84.
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catastrophe reinsurance crisis.'" In particular, catastrophic natural disasters
had inflicted losses to insurers and reinsurers worldwide including Lloyd's,
London, European, American, and Japanese insurance companies from 1988
to 1991.'" The crisis in the catastrophe reinsurance market returned to
normal quickly, but the crisis persisted for years in the liability insurance
market. 45 OPA 90 exacerbated the insurance market contraction by
generating demand for higher levels of pollution insurance, increasing
pressures on the reinsurance markets. Over 80 percent of the first layer of
the P&I Clubs' reinsurance contract is placed in London, less than 10
percent in the United States.'" Unless the U.S. reinsurance market assumes
a major role in the oil pollution liability business, reinsurance market
capacity constraints will be a long-term problem given the amount of
coverage sought by traders to the United States. 47
Even with a properly enforced financial responsibility rule,
substantially unlimited liability results in the potential of incomplete
compensation for large oil pollution costs from major oil spills because
financial responsibility is required only up to a limited amount. Because of
these limitations in financial responsibility, the financial responsibility rule
cannot be considered a complete solution for oil pollution risk management.
Solutions such as introducing cargo owner liability must be explored
beyond financial responsibility rules in the shipping sector.
III. CONCLUSION
The number and volume of oil spills from ships in U.S. waters has
fallen considerably since the enactment of OPA 90 and the implementation
of the financial responsibility regulations (see Appendix VII).'" The
shipping and oil industries have increased vigilance due partly to the

143. See Anne Gron &Andrew Winton, Risk Overhang and Market Behavior (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
144. See MERCER MGMT. CONSULTING, INC., supra note 62, at V-14.
145. See Gron & Winton, supra note 143, at 1.
146. See U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 16, at 28-30; 102d Cong., supra note 16, at 89 (1991)
(statement of Terence G. Coghlin, Chairman Designate, The International Group of P&I Clubs);
103d Cong., supra note 11, at 135 (statement of Richard L. Youell, Marine Underwriter at
Lloyd's of London); 101st Cong., supranote 16, at 31 (Temple, Barker & Sloane, Inc., Analysis
of Alternative Approaches to Tanker Oil Spill Liability and Compensation); Di Jin & Hauke
L. Kite-Powell, On the Optimal EnvironmentalLiabilityLimitfor Marine Oil Transport,35 TRANSP.

REs. 77,78 (1999).
147. See PETROLEUM INDus. RESEARCH FOUND., INC., supra note 7, at 77.

148. See U.S. Logs 7 Years without Massive Oil Spill, OIL &GAS J., Aug. 19, 1996, at 36.
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liability provisions of OPA 90.149 The COFR program has proceeded without
any serious problems in the flow of oil to the United States and in cost to
U.S. consumers. Remaining complexities willinvolve coordination between
P&I Clubs and new financial responsibility guarantors with respect to
insurance coverage and premiums. It remains tobe seen, however, whether
the reduction of oil spills in U.S. waters will be sustained in the future.
Persisting oil spills, even since the enactment of OPA 90, might imply that
a certain rate of oil spills is an inevitable and irreducible risk associated with
waterborne oil transportation under any legislation." °

149. See lust a Ticket for Owners to Trade?, Zurich Group, Dec. 24, 1996, Lloyd's List
International (on file with author); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 143 (2d ed. 1996).
150. See PERROW, supra note 135, at 180; Garick, supra note 54, at 292; Francis J. Gonynor,
Six Years before the Mast: The Evolution of the Oil PollutionAct of 1990,9 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 105,140
(1996).
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APPENDIX I
STATE OIL POLLUTION LIABILITY REGIMES BY LIMITATON OF
LIABILITY AND CATEGORY OF RESPONSIBLE PARTIES

IJLS

(4)

USO (7)
US (14)

"
*
*
•

ISO: limited liability on the shipping sector (vessel owner or operator) and the oil cargo
sector (oil cargo owner); FL, NJ and NY.
IS: limited liability on the shipping sector, DE, LA, TX and VA.
USO: unlimited liability on the shipping sector and the oil cargo sector, AK, CA, HI, MD,
NC, OR and WA.
US: unlimited liability on the shipping sector, AL, CT, GA, IL, ME, MA, MI, MN, MS, NH,
OH, PA, RI and SC.
Source: Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Inc., Transporting U.S. Oil Imports: The
Impact of Oil Spill Legislation on the Tanker Market Prepared for the U.S. Department of
Energy (1992); Mercer Management Consulting, Inc., An Analysis of the System of Oil
Pollution Control in California Marine Waters (1993); and Oil Pollution Liability: Hearing
Before the Subcomm on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 991 Cong. (1985) (Coast Guard, Oil Spill Liability and Compensation
Legislation Preemption Considerations).
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APPENDIX II

METHODS OF VESSEL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
GUARANTY (as of Fall 1993)

8 Int'l Group of P&l Clubs
HWQIS
0 Miscellaneous Commercial
Insurance Companies
* Lloyd's Underwriters
U Self-insurance or Financial

Guaranty
U Independent P&l Clubs
* Ingosstrakh. Insurance Company
of Russia
* U.S. Surety Bond Companies
IWarla, Insurance Company of
Poland

Number of financial responsibility guaranty by International Group of P&I
Clubs: 15,319
* Total number of fiancial responsibility guaranty: 22,496

*

Source: United States Coast Guard, Regulatory Impact Analysis Financial
Responsibility for Water Pollution (Vessels) (1994).
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APPENDIX IT

U.S. OIL PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS
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Domestic production includes crude oil, natural gas liquids, and other
hydrocarbons and alcohol production, but does not include refmery gain.
Source: United States Energy Information Administration, United States of
America (visited Oct. 11, 1999) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/usa.htn>.
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APPENDIX IV
CRUDE OIL REFINER ACQUISITION COSTS PER BARREL, 1970-1998

(Y: YEAR, P: PRICE)
Y
P
Y
3.40 76
70
3.60 77
71
3.58 78
72
4.15 79
73
9.07 80
74
10.38 81
75

P
10.89
11.96
12.46
17.72
28.07
35.24

Y
82
83
84
85
86
87

P
31.87
28.99
28.63
26.75
14.55
17.90

Y
88
89
90
91
92
93

P
14.67
17.97
22.22
19.06
18.43
16.41

Y
94
95
96
97
98

P
15.59
17.23
20.71
19.04
12.52

40
35
30

!25

10
5
0

Source: Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review (1992);
and Energy Information Administration, Petoleum Marketing Annual 1998
(1999).
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APPENDIX V
COMPONENTS OF RETAIL REGULAR GASOLINE PRICES PER GALLON, 1997

CRUDE OIL
$0.453

MANUFACTURING &
MARKETING
$0.347

TAXES
$0.399

RETAIL
PRICE
$1.199

MANUFACTURING &
MARKETING
29%

Source: Energy Information Administration, Petroleum: An Energy Profile 1999
(1999).
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APPENDIX VII
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APPENDIX VIII
NUMBER OF OIL SPILLS FROM TANK VESSELS IN U.S. WATERS, 1973-1997
1800
1600
14001200
1000
800

Total
Tanker

600.

Barge

400
200
0

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, PollutionIncident Compendium (visited Oct. 7, 1999)
<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmcresponse/stats/Summary.htm>.

VOLUME OF OIL SPILLS FROM TANK VESSELS IN U.S. WATERS, 1973-1997

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, PollutionIncident Compendium (visited Oct. 7, 1999)
<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/response/stats/Sunumary.htm>.

